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THE BANKRUPTCY ACT:
SOME EFFECTS OF THE 1966 AMENDMENTS TO
SECTIONS 17(a), 67(c), AND 70(c)
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to "establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." Attempts were begun in 1789 to establish a system of bankruptcy laws and from time to time until 1898 various laws were enacted to give temporary relief to debtors, but were
subsequently repealed for one reason or another. Finally in July of 1898,
the Bankruptcy Statute of 1898 was enacted. This statute, known as the
Bankruptcy Act,1 has been amended eighty-six times.2 The most recent
of these amendments were added in the summer of 1966, 3 when the
last session of the 89th Congress passed legislation amending the Bankruptcy Act in an attempt to provide for a more equitable discharge and
to clear up some of the existing inconsistencies while not completely
controverting the status of the federal tax lien. These additions should
have a significant effect, not only on the power of the trustee and the
debtors' discharge in bankruptcy, but also on the policies of the Treasury
Department as to the administration and collection of taxes. A look at
three of the most far reaching of these amendments will perhaps demonstrate the significance they will have on the law of bankruptcy and
give some indication as to the effects these changes will cause on the
current tax policies of the federal government.
The Bankruptcy Act was designed in an attempt to distribute the
bankrupt's assets equitably among his creditors. Equal distribution
among creditors, however, did not always prove to be the just solution,
and so priorities and security interests were accorded to certain classes
of creditors. Thus, creditors with liens received satisfaction before
assets became available to other or general creditors. This of course put
unsecured creditors in an unfavorable position, and they began seeking
legislation under state law which would give them priority. The government anticipated trouble and, when enacting the Chandler Act of 1938,4
destroyed state priorities, except for those of the landlords which were
postponed, in an effort to insure uniformity of distribution. Although
1. Short title added by 64 Stat. 1113 (1950).

2. Laube, 1966

COLLmR

PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY

ACT,

VIII-X (1966).

3. Pub. L. 89-495, 8 Stat. 268 (1966). Pub. L. 89-496, 8 Star. 270 (1966).
4. Pub. L. 699, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1940).
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state priorities were destroyed, the validity of a statutory lien was recognized. Thus, a general creditor might obtain state legislative action
making his debt a lien and so raise himself to a position of superiority
among general creditors and, in some cases, among other priority
claimants. Problems began to arise with both liens on specific assets and
disguised liens designed to take effect only on the insolvency of the
debtor. Tax claims compounded the problem as they also assumed the
position of statutory liens. It became apparent that the federally created
priorities under the Bankruptcy Act would be totally disrupted if all
statutory liens were given effect. The Chandler Act, in attempting to
solve this problem by creating priorities for the cost of administration
and wage claims over statutory liens on personal property not accompanied by possession, and by providing that liens should be restricted
"cexcept as against other liens," r inadvertantly paved the way for the
unanticipated judicial interpretation that followed. 6
Amendment was made in 1952 deleting the controversial clause "except as against other liens" and section 67 (c) (2) was added invalidating
all statutory liens against the trustee in bankruptcy on personal property
not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration or distraint. 7 This
settled the "circuity problem" s with regard to wages and rents, but the
problem continued to exist where a state law placed a lien, postponed
under the Bankruptcy Act, in a senior position to a lien unaffected by
postponement
The problem culminated in a Pennsylvania decision, In re Quaker
City Uniform Company,:' where the bankrupt had given two chattel
mortgages to creditors long before bankruptcy. The creditors held
validly recorded chattel mortgages and the contest was to determine
relative order of distribution among: (1) chattel mortgage holders prior
in time to any claimants; (2) the landlord of the bankrupt who had not
sold any property; (3) various wage claimants; and (4) administration
5. Weinstein, Tim BANKRUPTCY LAW oF 1938, sECTIoN 67(c) 144 (1938).
6. In Re Eakin Lumber Co., 39 F. Supp. 787, (N.D. W.Va. 1941). In this case, a junior
lien intervened and the rent or wage lien became unrestricted at the expense of general
creditors. Aff'd., R.F.C. v. Sun Lumber Co., 126 F.2d 731, 48 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 96 (1942).
7. Pub. L. 82-456, 66 Stat. 427 (1952).
8. S. Rep. No. 277, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 265 (1965). "Circuity of liens results when
lien B is subordinated to lien A but prior in right to lien C which, however, is in
turn entitled to priority over lien A."
9. H.R. Rep. No, 686,98th Cong. ist Sess. 265 (1965).
10. 134 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa.),238 F.2d 155 (CA. 3d Cir. 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S.
1030 (1957). The referee, the district court, and the court of appeals all arrived at
different conclusions as to the proper order of distribution.
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expenses. In Pennsylvania a distraint for rent is superior to a chattel
mortgage. The referee, the district court, and the court of appeals arrived at different conclusions as to the proper order of distribution. In
the final decision, the court of appeals followed the federal order of
distribution in allowing the cost of administration and wage claims ahead
of the other claims, but followed the state priorities placing the distraint
for rent ahead of the chattel mortgages. The cost of administration and
wage claims used up all the assets so that the landlord and the secured
creditors received nothing. Thus the question arose as to the value of
secured credit.
However, this Pennsylvania interpretation has not been followed in
other jurisdictions. In New Orleans v. Harrell," chattel mortgages were
paid first. The court reasoned that since secured priorities were not
postponed in section 67 (c)' 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, they should be
paid first, then the cost of administration, wage claims, and finally city
tax claims. In a California case, 1 3 involving priorities between federal
tax liens and state tax liens coupled with possession of the bankrupt's
personal property, the court interpreted section 67 (c) to be intended
to postpone payment of the federal tax lien on personal property not
accompanied by possession. This was in order to insure payment of the
administrative expenses and wage claims under section 64(a) (1) and (2),
and not to subordinate the lien to another lienholder who secures possession of the property prior to bankruptcy. The court thus upheld the
contention of the federal goverment in stating that the postponement of
federal tax liens under section 67 (c) is provided for the benefit of unsecured creditors, not for the benefit of other secured claimants.
These various interpretations have obviously thwarted attempts to
produce a uniform Bankruptcy Law and, as early as 1957, revisions to
section 67 (c), arising from the Quaker City'4 dilemma, were introduced
in Congress. 15 Subsequently Congress passed a bill which provided for
the postponement of tax liens on personal property not accompanied
by possession, not only to administration expenses and wage claims, but
also to all liens indefeasible in bankruptcy. 16 The bill was designed to
11. 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943).
12. 11 U.S.C.A. Section 107 (1940).

13. California State Department of Employment v. U.S., 210 F.2d 242 (CA. 9th Cir.
1954).

'

14. Supra note 10.
15. H.R. 5195, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
16. H.R. 7242,, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., Section 6 (1960).
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prevent the interpretation which appeared in the Quaker City case,' 7
but the Treasury Department objected on the basis that such an interpretation would result in a windfall to secured claims filed after the notice
of a tax lien,' 8 and the bill was subsequently vetoed by the President. 9
SEcrioNG
67(c)

The first of the 1966 amendments to be considered herein is the
latest change in section 67 (c) 21 which again tries to solve the "circuity
problem." The first part of this amendment lists three types of statutory
liens which are to be invalidated against the trustee in bankruptcy. 2' The
purpose of this part of the amendment is to do away with the so-called
spurious and secret liens by invalidating disguised priorities which are
not coupled with property rights by specifically doing away with
statutory liens which spring to life only at the date of the debtor's insolvency. It also invalidates liens against a trustee which would not
be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that
date, and liens for rents and distresses for rents which are provided for
in Part 2 of the amendment to this section.
The Senate Finance Committee was concerned as to the effect this
would have on the federal tax lien and proposed an additional clause to
17. Supra note 10.
18. Supra note 8.

19. Supra note 16, vetoed by the President on September 8, 1960, 106 Cong. Rec.
19168.
20. 11 U.S.C.A. Section 107(c) (1966).
21. Supra note 20, at (1), which provides:
(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of
the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution
against his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor.
(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of
bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor on that date, whether or not such purchaser exists; Provided, That where
a statutory lien is not invalid at the date of the bankruptcy against the trustee
under subdivision c of section 70 of this Act and is required by applicable lien law
to be perfected in order to be valid against a subsequent bona fide purchaser,
such a lien may nevertheless be valid under this subdivision, if perfected within
the time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of such law:
And provided further, That if applicable lien law requires a lien valid against the
trustee under section 70, subdivision c, to be perfected by the seizure of property,
it shall instead be perfected as permitted by this subdivision c of section 67 by
filing notice thereof with the court;
(C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of distress for rent, whether
statutory or not. A right of distress for rent which creates a security interest in
property shall be deemed a lien for the purposes of this subdivision c.
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this part of the amendment which would have followed clause B of
section 67(c) (1).22 The clause provided:
That, in the case of a statutory lien for taxes which were assessed
within one year prior to the date of bankruptcy, notice of such lien
shall be considered as being enforceable at the date of bankruptcy
against one aquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the
debtor on that date, if notice of such lien is filed within one year
after the date of the assessment of the taxes to which the lien relates
or within one month after the date of bankruptcy.2 3
This would have given the government a one-year period in which
its unfiled tax claims would still be considered superior to the general
creditor's represented by the trustee in bankruptcy, providing notices
of these liens were subsequently filed. The majority contended that
this would give the government time to decide whether or not it
should file notice of a tax lien, which might force some taxpayers into
bankruptcy, while retaining a secured position. However, the minority
pointed out that this proposal would "turn the bill against its sponsors
and pervert its purpose." 24 The minority argument was based upon
the intended purpose of the amendment to section 67(c) and the
holding in United States v. Speers. 25 The arguments were successful
and the clause was not added.
One of the most significant changes of this section of the amendment comes in part (1) (B) which provides:
if applicable lien law requires a lien valid against a trustee under
section 70, subdivision c, to be perfected by the seizure of property,
it shall instead be perfected as permitted by this subdivision c of sec26
tion 67 by filing notice thereof with this court.
...

Prior to this addition, a tax lien which required seizure of property to
become secured was not invalidated by failure to seize the property
but only postponed to clauses (1) and (2) of section 64(a). Now these
22. Supra note 20, which invalidates
is not perfected or enforceable at the
rights of a bona fide purchaser from
purchaser exist."
23. S. Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d
24. Id. at XI.
25. Infra note 54.
26. Supra note 20, at (1) (B).

against the trustee "every statutory lien which
date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the
the debtor on the date, whether or not such
Sess., at IX, Sec. 4 (1) (B) (1966).
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tax liens will be invalidated as a lien and fall into clause (4) of section
64(a) to receive priorities entitled to thereunder unless notice of the
lien has been filed with the proper court. The Treasury Department,
of course, objects to this reduction of priority, and is faced with a major
policy decision in regard to the filing of notice of tax liens.27 Until now,
the Treasury Department could examine the position of a taxpayer and
use its discretion as to whether to file a tax lien or to extend the due
date for taxes owed, giving the taxpayer a chance to recover financially.
It now seems quite logical that liens will have to be filed promptly
when the taxes become due, which may force many businesses and taxpayers into bankruptcy that previously might have been avoided.
The second section of the amendment to subsection c of section 6728
tries to clear up some of the confusion which resulted in the Quaker
City case in an attempt to once and for all answer the controversial
circuitry problem." " By making liens previously invalidated and subsequently not preserved by the court invalid against all liens indefeasible in bankruptcy this section eliminates the problem which was
created in the Quaker City case where the landlord prevailed over the
chattel mortgagee. Thus the chattel mortgage in that case which was
an indefeasible lien in bankruptcy would not have been subordinated to
the landlord's lien for rents. The section continues to build up an assured order of distribution while seemingly strengthening the value
of secured credit which was weakened by the Pennsylvania decision.
The amendment to section 67(c) (3)30 also provides for the post27. Letter from Treasury Department (Asst. Sec. Stanley S. Surrey) relating to H.R.
1961 in 87th Cong. carried forward as H.R. 136 with the deletion of Sec. 2 of H.R.
1961. IRE No. 1966-38, p. 129.
28. Supra note 20, at (2), which provides:
(2) The court may, on due notice, order any of the aforesaid liens invalidated
against the trustee to be preserved for the benefit of the estate and in that event
the lien shall pass to the trustee. A lien not preserved for the benefit of the
estate but invalidated against the trustee shall be invalid as against all liens indefeasible in bankruptcy, so as to have the effect of promoting liens indefeasible in
bankruptcy which would otherwise be subordinate to such invalidated lien.
Claims for wages, taxes, and rents secured by liens hereby invalidated or preserved shall be respectively allowable with priority and restricted as are debts
therefore entitled to priority under clauses (2), (4), and (5) of subdivision a of
section 64 of this Act, even though not otherwise granted priority.
29. 134 F. Supp. 596 (ED. PA.), 238 F.2d 155, (C.A.3d Cir. 1956), cert. den. 352 U.S.
1030 (1957).
30. Supra note 20, at (3), which provides:
(3) Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession shall be
postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
a of section 64 of this Act. Where such a tax lien is prior in right to liens
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ponement of all tax liens on personal property not accompanied by
possession to (1) cost of administration and (2) wage claims under
section 64(a) of the Act. As to other liens indefeasible in bankruptcy
and tax liens, where notice was properly filed under the amendment to
67(c) (1) (B), 3 ' the common law principle of "prior in time, prior in
right" determines the order of distribution. 2 The results of this section
are more clearly seen through two hypothetical situations:
(A) D is bankrupt. The federal government holds a valid tax lien of
$5,000 for back taxes on his personal property which has not
been reduced to possession. This lien is prior in time to a subsequent chattel mortgage of $4,000 on the same property. There
are also wage claims of $1,500 due $500 each to three workmen of
D. The cost of administration of the bankrupt's estate is $1,000.
The bankrupt's personal property is sold for $8,000 and the
cost of the sale is $200. Under the new amendment to 67(c) (3)
the distribution would be as follows:
Cost of sale of personal property ...................

$ 200

The amount remaining of the tax lien, $5,000 to be
paid as follows:
Cost of administration ...........................
W age Claims ...................................

$1,000
1,500

T ax lien ....................................... 2,500*
Chattel mortgage ...............................

2,800

$8,000

indefeasible in bankruptcy, the court shall order payment from the proceeds
derived from the sale of the personal property to which the tax lien attaches,
less the actual cost of the sale, of an amount not in excess of the tax lien, to the
debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act.
If the amount realized from the sale exceeds the total of such debts, after allowing for prior indefeasible liens and the cost of the sale, the excess up to the
amount of the difference between the total paid to the debts specified in clauses
(1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act. and the amount of the
tax lien, is to be paid to the holder of the tax lien.
31. Supra note 26.
32. State, ex. rel. State Highway Commission v. Mecher, 75 Wyo. 210; 212, 294 P.2d
603,605 (1956).
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(B) Same facts as above only the chattel mortgage is prior in time
to the federal government's tax lien:
Cost of Sale .....................................
Chattel mortgage ................................

$ 200
$4,000

The amount remaining to be paid as follows:
Cost of administration ..........................
W age Claims ..................................
Tax liens ......................................

$1,000
1,500
1,300*
$8,000

*It should be noted here that the remaining taxes owed are not discharged unless they fall under the new amendment to 17(a) but are
entitled to priority under section 64(a) (4) on the unsecured assets
of the estate.
These changes seem to remedy the shortcomings of the Quaker City
distribution33 and that proposed in H.R. 7242. 34 The postponement of
the tax lien to (1) cost of administration and (2) wage claims, while
not completely controverting the status of the federal tax lien, seems
to be a more logical and equitable distribution. It is interesting to note
that the solution Congress adopts here in solving the "circuity problem"
was already being used in various jurisdictions.35
The Treasury Department until this time3 6 was following the de33. Supra note 29. Under the Quaker City order of distribution in either example
would be: cost of the sale of the property-200, cost of administration-1,000, wage
claims-$1,500, tax lien-S5,000, and chattel mortgages-S300. In the second example then,

the chattel mortgage, recorded prior to the tax lien received only $300 of the $4,000
due while the subsequent tax lien was paid in full. See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 265 (1965).
34. H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1960). Under both cases H.R. 7242 would have
distributed the assets as follows: cost of sale-$200, chattel mortgage& .4,000, cost of

administration-S1,000, wage claims-$1,500, and tax lien-1,300. Under this case in example one, the subsequent chattel mortgage is paid in full but the tax lien prior in time
receives only $1,300 of the $5,000 due. See H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong. Ist Sess.
265 (1965).
35. See California State Department of Employment v. U.S., 210 F.2d 242 (C.A. 9th
Cir. 1954); In Re American Zyloptic Co., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 77 (ED. N.Y. 1960); In Re
Empire Granite Co., 42 F.Supp. 450 (MD.G.A. 1942). These three courts have already
interpreted the existing statute to mean what the present amendment assures.
36. TIR 316, April 26, 1961.
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cision of United States v. City of New Britain 7 in the administration

of its policies. In the New Britain case the court adopted the "prior
in time, prior in right" rule which the present amendment to section
67(c) (3) adopts. 88 Although the Treasury has followed this case and
thus supports to an extent the present solution provided by the new section 67 (c) for remedying the "circuity problem," the Treasury feels
that there is still room for judicial interpretation due to the use of
the term "indefeasible lien." The Department speculates that there is
a possibility that indefeasible liens would be paid immediately after
cost of administration and wage claims, thus subordinating tax claims
once again.89 In hopes of finding a solution that would have a more
general application to the "circuity problem," the Department offered
an alternate amendment to section 67(c) (3) which would cause not
only tax liens but other statutory liens to share the burden of payments
for cost of administration and wage claims. The Treasury Department
has an obvious point in trying to protect its position and spread the
burden of administrative costs and wage claims, but Congress has failed
to adopt this solution. However, they have moved in the right direction by this amendment in eliminating the existing state of the law, and
if interpretation follows their intent, the "circuity problem" should be
solved.
SECTION

70(c)

The second 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act to be discussed
is the change in section 70(c), 40 popularly known as the "strong arm
clause," which enumerates the rights and powers of the trustee in
bankruptcy, and which is designed to provide broad powers so that
an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets may be effected among
the creditors. In order to insure the rights and remedies provided for
the trustee in bankruptcy and at the same time to clarify the existing
confusion as to the trustee's position, this section was amended as
follows:

-

The trustee may have the benefit of all the defenses available to the
bankrupt as against third persons, including statutes of limitation,
37. 347 U.S. 81, which remanded sub. nom. Brown v. General Laundry Service, 19
Conn. Sup. 335, 113 A.2d 601 (1955).

38. Supra note 32.
39. Supra note 27.
40. 11 US.CA. Section 110(c) (1966).
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statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses; and a waiver of
any such defense by the bankrupt after bankruptcy shall not bind the
trustee. The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights
and powers of: (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against the
bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor
exists, (2) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an
execution returned unsatisfied against the bankrupt, whether or not
such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all
property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the
court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract
could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
If a transfer is valid in part against creditors whose rights and powers
are conferred upon the trustee under this subdivision, it shall be valid
to a like extent against the trustee. In cases where repugnancy or inconsistency exists with reference to the rights and powers in this subdivision conferred, the trustee may elect which rights and powers to
exercise with reference to a particular party, a particular remedy, or
a particular transaction, without prejudice to his right to maintain a
different position with reference to a different party, a different
remedy, or a different transaction. 41 [Emphasis added.]
The importance of the trustee in bankruptcy and his remedies against
other claimants is very crucial, and from time to time the position he
holds has been subject to various interpretations. Until 1950, the Act
provided that a trustee had "all the rights of a judicial lien creditor as
to the property coming into the possession of the bankruptcy court, and
the rights of a judgment creditor holding an unsatisfied execution on all
other property." ' An amendment in 1950 transferred the trustee to the
position of a judicial lien creditor in regard to all property. It was
fairly obvious from the committee report which accompanied that
legislation that the Congress did not intend to lessen the trustee's
powers, but rather to put him in a more satisfactory position, reasoning
that a lien holder is in a better position than a judgment creditor with
an execution returned unsatisfied. 43 It seems that if the legislative pur41. Id., This amendment retained the first sentence of the prior section 70(c) but
goes on to give the trustee the powers of an actual judgment creditor rather than the
status of a hypothetical lien creditor which the previous act gave him.
42. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1965).
43. H.R. Rep. 1293, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1949).
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pose and intent had prevailed, the jurisdictional differences which
44
followed would have been eliminated.
The major dispute which resulted from judicial interpretation was
whether or not the trustee was a judgment creditor. The importance
of this relates to section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code which
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and (d), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been
filed by the Secretary or his delegate . . . in the appropriate office. 45
[Emphasis added.]
Depending then on the interpretation concerning the status of a trustee
in bankruptcy, tax liens imposed without notice might be invalidated
against him.
Until recently, most of the decisions held that the trustee was not
a judgment creditor, thus tax liens did not have to be recorded to be
valid secured liens in bankruptcy. 46 Although In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corporation47 was perhaps the earliest case to hold that the trustee
was not a judgment creditor, the court offered no explanation of its
decision, and so most cases agreeing with this decision are based upon
the holding of United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc. 48 The Gilbert
case involved neither a bankruptcy proceeding nor the rights of a
trustee in.bankruptcy, but rather a state insolvency proceeding. The
issue was whether an unrecorded federal tax lien was valid as against
a municipal tax assessment which had neither been reduced to a judgment nor accorded "judgment creditor" status by any statute. The state
court conveniently gave the tax assessment the character "in the nature
of a judgment." The Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating
that on the basis of uniformity a judgment creditor should have the
same application in all states, thus interpreting Congressional use of
the words "judgment creditor" in the conventional sense of a judg44. Supra notes 35-40.
45. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323.
46. See Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Fidelity Tube Corp. 278
F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1960); Simonson v. Granquist, F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961); In re Taylor-

craft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. England, 226 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1955).

47. Id.
48. 345 U.S. 361 (1953). Accord U.S. v. Aeri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
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ment of a court of record. 49 The majority of decisions which have
followed this holding, that the trustee was not a judgment creditor for
the purpose of section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, have thus
used the language of the Supreme Court in the Gilbert case to support
their position, even though the case had nothing to do with the interrelationship of section 6323 and the Bankruptcy Act.
The opposite view, holding that a trustee in bankruptcy is a judgment creditor, first appeared in the 1940 case of United States v. Sands5"
in which it was asserted as dicta that a trustee in bankruptcy comes
within the meaning of a judgment creditor. Although this case was
subsequently overruled in its own jurisdiction by Brust v. Sturr,51 decided after the Gilbert case, it was, prior to that time, the leading
authority on that subject. The reversal evolved from an unsuccessful
attempt in Congress in 1954 to exclude from section 6323 "artificial"
judgment creditors like the trustee in bankruptcy. 52 The proposal was
rejected, deeming it "advisable to continue to rely upon judicial interpretation of existing law instead of attempting to prescribe statutory
rules." 11 The reference was apparently meant to be to the Gilbert
decision. Thus, through a misinterpretation of Congressional intent,
the Gilbert case, thought prior to this time not used to decide the
rights of a trustee in bankruptcy against unrecorded tax liens, paved
54
the way for the resulting decision in United States v. Speers.
The case of United States v. Speers directly presented the question
of whether a federal tax lien, unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy,
was valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy and whether the trustee
was a "judgment creditor" within the meaning of 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, thus taking priority to tax liens imposed without notice
under section 6323. On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court upheld
the judgment in the Speers case, giving the trustee in bankruptcy the
position of a judgment creditor and clearing up the once existing
dispute."
49. Id. at 364.
50. 174 F.2d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1949). Accord In re Fisher Plastic Corp., 89 F.Supp.
446, 448 (D. Mass. 1950); In re Sport Coal Co., 125 F.Supp. 517 (S.D. W.Va. 1054);
F. Avery and Sons Co. v. Davis, 226 F.2d 9429 (4th Cir. 1955); In re Sayre Village
Manor, Inc, 120 F. Supp. 215 (N.D.J. 1954).
51. Supra note 44.
52. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, P. A407.

53. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, P. 875.
54. 382 U.S. 266 (1965).

55. The referee, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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The new section 70(c), besides codifying the Speers case and thus
clearing up the existing confusion as to the trustee's position, also gives
the trustee the express rights of a creditor who, upon the date of bankruptcy, obtains an execution return unsatisfied. This addition gives
the trustee powers, such as discovery to inquire as to property over
which he gains title but the extent and location of which is not known,
which are available under some state laws only to creditors occupying
this position. The effect of this revision is to reinstate the trustee to
his former position of a judgment execution creditor which the 1950
6
amendment had taken away from him.s
The obvious effect of this amendment, as well as 67 (c), is that the
Treasury Department will be forced to file notice of tax liens in most
cases where they previously have recognized a policy of discretion in
allowing extensions of time for taxes due. Prior to the enactment of
the amendments to 67(c) and 70(c), the Department recognized the
possibility that such consequences might result and unsuccessfully proposed deleting those portions of the amendments which made the
trustee a judgment creditor.
SECTION 17(A)

The last of the 1966 amendments to be considered here is section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act which provides for the release of a bankrupt
from his provable debts except those listed therein. Prior to the 1966
amendment, section 17(a) (1) provided: "a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, whether
allowable in full or in part, except as such are due as a tax levied by
,
the United States, or any State, county, district, or municipality ....
The 1966 amendment to section 17(a) (1),58 possibly the most significant of the new amendments to the law of bankruptcy, provides
all found for the Trustee. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict which existed between the decision of the lower court and the decisions from the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. Supra note 44.
56. Laube, 1966 cOLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY ACT, A1442 (1966).
57. Id. at A32.1 (1966).
58. 11 U.S.C.A. Section 35(a) (1), which provides for release of debts except as to:
...taxes which become legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United
States or to any State or any subdivision thereof within three years preceding
bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes (a) which were not assessed in any case in
which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, (b) which were
assessed within one year preceding bankruptcy in any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, (c)which were not reported on
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for an absolute release of a debtor in bankruptcy of all taxes except
those which became "legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the
United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof within three
years preceding bankruptcy." The section does not, however, release
a bankrupt in situations where he has failed to make returns, made
omissions from returns, or has not payed taxes he has collected or
withheld for others, and specifically provides that this release does not
bar or place any time limit on any valid tax liens.
The Congress was faced here with the problem of, on the one hand,
wanting to provide for an absolute discharge of tax debts, absent
fraud and other stated conditions, and, on the other, with the problem
which would arise if they enacted into the statute a provision which
would make voluntary bankruptcy a tax-evasive device. An alternative
proposal was considered in lieu of this amendment which suggested
that a limitation be made on the collection of prebankruptcy Federal
tax liens, limiting them in any one year to 10% of the taxpayer's income after taxes. The Senate believed that this would be a better
solution than an absolute discharge of certain prebankruptcy Federal
taxes, and would discourage voluntary bankruptcies while enabling
rehabilitation. 9
Congress finally chose to enact the three-year limit coinciding with
the three-year statute of limitations for tax assessments under the
Internal Revenue Code"0 which they felt should prevent petitions in
bankruptcy to avoid tax liabilities and also enable a complete recovery
after bankruptcy for any energetic individual. However, this amendment makes it clear that there is no discharge or effect on tax debts
which have been made valid tax liens. 61 The exceptions to this threeyear limitation were incorporated in order to guard against the situaa return made by the bankrupt and which were not assessed prior to bankruptcy
by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the exhaustion of administrative
or judicial remedies available to the bankrupt, (d) with respect to which the
bankrupt made a false or fraudulent return, or willfully attempted in any manner
to evade or defeat or (e) which the bankrupt was collected or withheld from
others as required by the laws of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, but was not paid over; but a discharge shall not be a bar to any
remedies available under applicable law to the United States or to any State or
any subdivision thereof, against the exemption of the bankrupt allowed by law
and duly set apart to him under this Act.
59. S. Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
60. INr.RFv. CODE of 1954, § 6501.
61. Supra note 58, ". . . but a discharge shall not be a bar to any remedies available
under applicable law to the United States or .... "
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tion where the fraud of a taxpayer would make this section a taxevading device in bankruptcy.
Prior to 1966, section 17(a) was perhaps morally sound, but presented certain inequities. A comparison between a single taxpayer and
a corporate taxpayer both discharged in bankruptcy points out some
of these inequities. The single taxpayer would have to pay any remaining tax debts out of any assets he might acquire after discharge;
while the discharged corporation, although technically not released
from tax debts, could simply change its corporate form, and thereby
avoid future recovery of its remaining debt.
The importance of this amendment is obvious for the very reasons
for the enactment of a bankruptcy law. The theory that a bankrupt
should be able to start on a fresh path of rehabilitation after a discharge in bankruptcy has been prevented due to the nondischargabiity
of tax debts under the previous law. The ever-increasing propensity
of the tax burden has caused this factor to become one of the major
drawbacks to a discharge in bankruptcy.
SUMMARY

In amending Federal statutes, Congress must always weigh the potential benefits of the amendment against any harm that might be
caused, not only to the law itself, but also to any interrelated law or
administrative policy. The amendments discussed herein present just
such a dilemma. In enacting these amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, Congress had to weigh the benefits of a more uniform code for
the financially unfortunate against the harm which might result when
such persons are relieved of paying their portion of the tax burden.
It seems that the enactment of these amendments may also force
the Treasury Department to change its policy in regard to filing notices
of tax liens, in order that it might secure its position in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Due to such a policy change, there is an indication that
the number of bankruptcies may increase, as the Treasury Department's previous use of discretion regarding postponement of the filing
of notices of tax liens will now not generally be exercised so readily.
Thus with the notice of the tax lien filed against him, the taxpayer
may have a hard time obtaining the necessary credit to run his business,
and he may be forced into bankruptcy. Even more far-reaching effects
may be caused where the bankruptcy puts the taxpayer's employees out
of work, stops orders for materials, and generally disrupts the economic
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pattern. Hopefully, however, although the Treasury Department will
be forced to readjust its policies concerning the filing of notices of
liens, the use of technological advances such as data processing which
is currently being put into effect will enable it to still use some discretionary policies, by providing more accurate and readily available
information concerning the position of the taxpayer.
Although it is thus apparent that these amendments will cause
definite changes in the Administration's Federal tax policies, the benefits
derived from the settling of the "circuity problem," the invalidation
of secret and other spurious liens against a trustee in bankruptcy, the
afirmance of the trustee's position as a judgment creditor, and the
release of a bankrupt by a discharge in bankruptcy of all taxes except
those which became legally due and owing within three years prior to
bankruptcy, seem to outweigh any disadvantage of such policy
changes. The amendments will cause the loss of some tax funds, but
with effective administration and enforcement, this effect should be
minimized and far outweighed by the benefits of a more uniform and
equitable Bankruptcy Act.
Mark S. Dray

